

# The Reality of the Dilemma of the Township Civil Servants' Incentives and the Crack Path

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## Abstract

Stimulating the potential of grassroots civil servants and prompting them to take the initiative and assume responsibility has become an important issue in current civil service management. Based on the interviews and observations during the field research in H Township, J County, Sichuan Province, this study combs through the factors constraining township civil servants from the perspective of two-dimensional interaction between the organization and the system. From the viewpoint of the internal structure of the organization, the three groups, namely, establishment status conversion, personnel of county-level sinking departments and young groups, face the most prominent motivational dilemmas; from the viewpoint of the institutional environment in which the organization is situated, the promotion system, the accountability system and the appraisal system are the key factors constraining the civil servants' actions. In order to effectively motivate township civil servants to act on their own initiative and create public value, changes should be made to optimize the incentive mechanism for township civil servants, starting with changes to the pay system, the cultivation of organizational culture, promotion channels, and the reduction of burdens at the grass-roots level.

## Keywords

Township Civil Servants, Organizational Incentives, Creating Public value.

## 1. Introduction

The Chinese Government consists of five tiers from top to bottom: central, provincial, municipal, county and township. Among them, townships, as the lowest level of administration, play an important role in promoting local economic development and maintaining social stability. From the perspective of policy implementation, township cadres are often responsible for implementing policy content and accomplishing policy goals, and the strength and enthusiasm of their implementation will have a direct impact on policy effects. Grassroots civil servants often have greater discretionary power when facing complex work situations, i.e., they show great flexibility in handling public affairs. Flexible governance mechanisms, such as favoritism, relationships, and face-saving, are key factors that cannot be ignored when observing China's grassroots policy implementation. However, such flexibility is still a passive way of implementing top-down policies and carrying out top-down political intentions. The behavioral logic of grass-roots civil servants under a pressure-based system often manifests itself in a "get the job done" mentality, with a general lack of motivation to create public value.

In grass-roots practice, a large number of changes have been made within government organizations to motivate members of the organization. On the one hand, this has manifested itself in the form of negative incentives such as inspections and appraisals to push public officials at the grass-roots level of government to do things. With the project resources to the townships, the center of gravity of social governance downward, and the increase of local central work, the higher government departments in order to promote the realization of policy

objectives, need to rely on the Discipline Inspection Commission, the goal of the Office of the Supervisor, and other forms of inspection and assessment to promote the implementation of work tasks. For townships at the grass-roots level, there are more and more assessment projects at higher levels, and the indicators are becoming more and more refined, with regular ranking and evaluation, and more and more red tape accordingly. Grass-roots civil servants need to bear the corresponding pressure of accountability if the implementation is not in place. On the other hand, through the innovation of organizational mechanisms, we have been able to motivate and mobilize members of the organization. For example, through the adjustment of the establishment, re-adjustment of people and things within the organization, so that the two match each other, so that through the "no change in the system to change the mechanism" way to motivate grass-roots civil servants[1]. However, these measures fail to overcome the inherent shortcomings of hierarchical organizations and effectively motivate civil servants to take the initiative. A comprehensive understanding of the factors and practical dilemmas that constrain the initiative of grassroots civil servants is an important foundation for dealing with the current cadres at the grassroots level.

## 2. Literature Review

Existing studies have mostly analyzed the behavioral perspective of public organizations[2], based on the empirical analysis of a factor based on motivation theory, such as self-efficacy[3], the sense of access[4], or to explore the motivational role of the organizational culture on the members of the organization. The public organization line perspective is weak in its analysis of the external environment in which grassroots government organizations are situated, especially ignoring the motivational effects of the specific work situations of grassroots civil servants and the interactions between upper and lower levels of the organization. From the perspective of organizational sociology, most townships, as administrative units at the departmental level, have to deal with a lot of grass-roots affairs, and their workloads are difficult, and the demands on township civil servants are getting higher and higher[5]. However, they are faced with the dilemma of the mismatch of "power, responsibility and profit", the shortcomings of the hierarchical system itself and the increasing demands of governance[6]. The incentives received by township civil servants are not proportional to their efforts, and many problems such as poor working conditions, low pay, narrow promotion space, and high pressure persist[7], the incentive effect of the system of parallel promotion of positions and grades still needs to be strengthened[8], resulting in township civil servants experiencing occupational laxity, a decline in motivation to start up their own businesses, and even affecting the implementation of the government in individual localities. In reality, many grass-roots civil servants see no hope of promotion after choosing to take the initiative to lie flat, "official oil" gradually showing a younger trend, the work enthusiasm to a certain extent has also been affected. Most of these civil servants are able to fulfill their job responsibilities, but generally lack a public spirit of charity[9] and the motivation to create public value[10].

Generally speaking, civil service organizations are regarded as hierarchical organizations. The fact that hierarchical organizations are characterized by rules and regulations determines the tendency of civil servants in hierarchical organizations to behave conservatively and not to take the initiative, a characteristic that has long made the hierarchical system a subject of debate in academic circles. However, the sectional system cannot fully explain the inactive behavior of Chinese civil servants at the grassroots level. Zhou Xueguang distinguishes between Chinese and Western civil servants' behavioral logic. In the West, the more perfect administrative procedures provide shelter for civil servants, and civil servants are not responsible for mistakes made under the premise of strictly following administrative procedures. On the contrary, under the institutional arrangements of upward accountability, one-vote veto system and imperfect

administrative procedures in China, civil servants show inaction under the domination of the logic of "not making mistakes"[11]. Most of these studies follow the logic of interaction between organization members and the system, neglecting the analysis of the internal structure of the organization and the organizational system in which it is situated. At the same time, thanks to the good local financial situation, the material incentive effect is obvious in the eastern coastal developed areas, and the remuneration level of grassroots civil servants is higher, attracting a large number of talents to employment. However, in the central and western regions, especially the remote mountainous areas, the economic conditions are backward and the local finances are dependent on the transfer payments from the central government, so the way of incentivizing grass-roots civil servants by merely imitating the eastern regions is not very applicable. On the contrary, townships in economically backward areas in central and western China should motivate township civil servants to take the initiative from the dimensions of organizational structure and organizational system.

### 3. Research Methodology

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the reality of the dilemma of incentivizing township civil servants in the central and western regions, the researcher collected data and information through fieldwork, using the interview method and observation method. The researcher was personally stationed to obtain more direct and credible data from the first perspective, especially utilizing informal interview opportunities to obtain more basic data, in order to gain a more in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the current dilemma of incentives for civil servants in townships. During August, the researcher carried out a total of 15 days of field-based research in a number of townships in County J, Sichuan Province, with the main information coming from the field research in Town H. The researcher mainly collected data through interviews and observations, in which the interviews were conducted by using the interview method and observation method. The researcher mainly collected data through interviews and observations, including interviews with sixteen township cadres, including the mayor, deputy mayor, secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission, director of the National People's Congress, and secretary of the Political and Legal Committee.

H town belongs to J county in Sichuan province, merged by three original townships, the land area is the largest in the county, the town population of about 30,000 people. H town government compared to other streets and townships in J county, the size of the government public service personnel is small, consisting of five categories of personnel: first, government leadership team members, the existing 11 people, second, the administrative establishment of the staff, a total of 16 people, the third is the establishment of the staff of the career of 25 people, the fourth is the county-level departments. The majority of civil servants in H-town government have settled in other streets and townships, and since the town is located in a remote mountainous area, the overall infrastructure and the work scene it faces are more backward than in other townships, and most of the civil servants choose to live directly in the swing space provided by the town government during the working day, the inconvenient conditions leading to a high turnover of personnel within the organization. Thus, the problem of motivating civil servants in town H is most typical and prominent, and the goal of the organization is not only to bring into play the enthusiasm of its members to work and start businesses, but also to keep experienced and capable grass-roots civil servants.

### 4. The Real dilemmas of incentive for township civil servants

Bad institutional arrangements lead to bad incentives[12], and this is also true for the incentive mechanism of civil servants at the grass-roots level. In the process of operation of the current administrative system, due to the interaction of complex organizational and institutional

arrangements, the incentive system of the organization itself will inevitably fail, or even go against the wishes.

#### **4.1. Analysis of Organizational Structure.**

The composition and structural arrangement of personnel within the organization is a factor that directly affects the initiative of grass-roots civil servants. The structural dilemma of motivating members of the H-township government organization is mainly manifested in three categories of personnel: the internal staffing of the township government, the second is the sinking of personnel from the county departments, and the third is the young civil servants in the organization.

First, the parallelism of the two types of establishment in the township creates negative incentives. As Township H is located in a remote and mountainous area, there is a certain shortage of staffing, resulting in some of the on-the-job duties that should be performed by civil servants with administrative staffing being taken on by career staff. Township governments usually have both administrative and career staffing, and it is generally believed that the former is superior to the latter, implying that switching status from the latter to the former would be an effective incentive. However, the research found that this has become a paradox. This is due to the fact that many grassroots civil servants believe that there is virtually no difference in salary between the administrative and career programs, but that the burden on the former is far greater than that on the latter. A township government civil servant who was transferred from the career establishment to the official administrative establishment three years ago said that despite the change in the type of civil service establishment, the work performed was still the same as that of the original post, and that there had been no significant change in the responsibilities and authority of the job. At the same time, as the work of the township is often carried out in a campaign style, after obtaining the formal administrative establishment, in addition to maintaining the original work content also need to undertake some completely new work content. Secondly, after the restructuring of the establishment, the remuneration package has not been upgraded. The civil servant said that he got about \$6,000 a month during the career establishment period, and there is no difference between the present pay level and that during the career establishment period. After the transformation of the career establishment into a formal administrative establishment, the workload of an individual has increased without any significant improvement in his remuneration package. Comparison of individual vertical time will easily make the grass-roots workers psychologically resistant to their work and dissatisfied with their work. It is thus clear that the change of status between the two establishments has not served as an incentive, and has even become a disadvantage.

Second, it is difficult to effectively incentivize the sinking of county departments. As the "legs" of the county departments, the townships mainly mobilize the resources of the townships by sinking departmental personnel within the township government. The county departments sunk in the townships are the Natural Resources Bureau, Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Bureau, Comprehensive Law Enforcement Bureau, and the Transportation Bureau, with a total of 14 personnel. In the case of the township's natural resources office, for example, there are three personnel sunk in the county department, whose work includes prevention of geologic hazards, forest fire prevention and suppression, such as daily inspections of risky disaster sites such as landslides and avalanches, as well as various publicity activities. They are under dual leadership, led by the township government on the one hand, and under the operational jurisdiction of the Natural Resources Bureau (NRB), the competent operational department at the county level, on the other hand, and are closely linked to the county NRB in terms of daily work interface. From the perspective of the structural system of national governance, sinking the Natural Resources Institute to the grassroots level helps to carry out daily preventive and investigative work, and in case of risks, it can be the first time to deal with the risks and take

corresponding rescue measures, so as to minimize the losses caused by the risks of natural disasters. However, from the perspective of the county departments, the bureaus have a lot of affairs and are reluctant to sink young and capable civil servants to the townships. Instead, they prefer to send the so-called "old, sick and disabled", who are about to retire, to the townships. In response to this problem, the civil servants who have been sent down to the townships are themselves aware of it, and so they have a psychological feeling of being "abandoned". This state of affairs makes them work at the grassroots level with the mentality of getting by, ensuring that they do not make mistakes in their daily work, and seldom, if ever, take the initiative to consider how to take the initiative to create public value and lead and drive the development of the local community. Therefore, due to their age and personal reasons, the sinking staff of the department have a weaker sense of initiative than other sections.

Finally, it is increasingly difficult to motivate young cadres in townships. Young cadres in townships mainly refer to the young people after 90 and 00 who newly entered the township government, and some of them chose to take the initiative to lie down when they first entered the system. In the interviews, it was learned that this group of young people generally grew up under the environment of gradually rich material conditions, life security is more adequate, and personal values are different from those of their parents. Some young civil servants believe that a stable job is enough, not willing to engage in hard work, and even unwilling to take leadership positions. This is because in their view, the salary of leadership positions does not match the cost of time and pressure, but rather not as comfortable as allowing themselves to work. On the other hand, the spiritual incentives based on ideals and beliefs do not have a significant effect on the motivation of young civil servants in townships. On the contrary, grass-roots young civil servants uphold a pragmatic mentality, attaching more importance to material incentives and emphasizing practical effects. Therefore, the difficulty of motivating young cadres in townships is more specifically manifested in the fact that some of them do not have life pressure and do not want to bear work pressure, and this attitude leads to the fact that they only seek to accomplish their own work. How to find a suitable way to stimulate the initiative and motivation of young grassroots civil servants in their work has become one of the problems that need to be solved urgently in the development of government organizations.

#### **4.2. Organization's Institutional Arrangements.**

Township government organizations face similar institutional constraints and incentives. Unlike group-like dilemmas in the organizational structure dimension, the poor incentives generated by organizational institutional arrangements are common constraints shared by different groups within the organization. According to the actual research, the institutional arrangements in H-township government that impede civil servants' initiative are the promotion system, the accountability system, and the performance appraisal system.

First, the hidden promotion system within the administrative system dissipates the motivation of middle-level civil servants; only a few members of the leadership team in H-town were promoted directly from within the H-town government, and most of the leadership team members were "parachuted in". From the point of view of these cadres' past career history, the "birth" of the multiple dimensional from the higher level of the key departments, such as the Municipal Public Security Bureau, the County Organization Department, the County Policy Research Office, etc. Most of these cadres' predecessors were also successful in their work. Most of the predecessors of these cadres have also been successfully promoted, such as serving as a leader of an economically developed township, director of a county department, member of the county leadership team, etc. In fact, H-town, as a representative of the local remote and arduous areas, has gradually become a springboard for the career advancement of young cadres, which explains why the overall appearance of civil servants in this H-town is younger than that of other townships. This promotion incentive arrangement is closely related to the future career

development of members of the leadership team, while those mid-level civil servants themselves promotion space is "foreign" cadres crowded out, their career development of the "ceiling" effect is more obvious than other townships. Therefore, the hidden promotion incentive within the administrative system is to combat the enthusiasm of middle-level civil servants at the expense of the purpose of training and motivating members of the leadership team. Within the administrative system, middle-level civil servants are a large group, with enormous administrative potential, but this implicit promotion arrangement prevents the release of administrative efficiency to create more public value.

Secondly, the strict accountability arrangements within the administrative system reinforce the conservative tendencies of grass-roots civil servants. Township work can be divided into two main types, one of which is to cope with the line of business work, with civil servants in the office dealing with a variety of documents, statements and other paperwork. The other is more oriented to the street bureaucracy, which requires township cadres to go down to the villages and to the grassroots site to solve and deal with public affairs, for example, cadres of the judicial office often need to go down to the villages to mediate conflicts and disputes, and cadres of the chartered villages need to be stationed in the villages to deal with the affairs of the villages. Because of the specific grass-roots affairs often show ambiguity and complexity, solve specific problems often need a certain degree of flexibility, that is, discretionary power. However, in practice, the township cadres reflect that "many things even if they have the idea to do, but in the end is often no end". Because they do not have the corresponding decision-making power, resource allocation and administrative law enforcement power, so individuals are often in a state of powerlessness, and everything is "legal and reasonable compliance". Because H township is located in the mountainous area, the difficulty of township cadres to complete the tasks is also much more difficult than other townships, for example, H township jurisdiction will often be landslides, floods and other natural disasters, but these disasters are often sudden and unpredictable, the township cadres to face these problems can only be in accordance with the provisions of the organization to complete the tasks within the scope of responsibility, their own enthusiasm is not high. In some special circumstances can not meet the higher requirements, township cadres can only "symbolic implementation" "selective implementation". At the same time, as the most basic administrative units, township civil servants are faced with the implementation of various policies and trivial conflicts every day. The interests of the central government and the local government are not always the same, and the grass-roots civil servants often encounter some difficult problems between the upper orders and the local interests, and they can only cautiously walk on the edge of the policy, and have to break through the bottom line in some special circumstances. Especially due to the gradual improvement of the grass-roots monitoring system, grass-roots civil servants for the avoidance of responsibility considerations, more "can not let go", so that the grass-roots "cadres not subject to disciplinary action is not a good cadre," as if it has become a kind of consensus. Despite the fact that grassroots cadres protect local interests, they will inevitably be criticized and disciplined by the Discipline Inspection Commission and the Target Inspection Office. Due to the promotion system of China's civil service, the impact of disciplinary action at a critical age can have an immeasurable impact on an individual's career development. As some of the interviewees said, "it is naturally best not to be disciplined," implying that under multiple pressures, the stringent accountability system and the lack of a fault-tolerance system catalyze grass-roots civil servants' tendency to choose to avoid responsibility rather than act proactively. Finally, the government performance appraisal system arrangement crowds out the work energy of township civil servants. In the practice of grassroots governance, appraisal and assessment behaviors have instead become an incentive for red tape, generating a heavy burden of rules and administrative costs[13]. As the center of gravity of social governance moves downward, the administrative affairs of townships increase, and the administrative

assessment indicators of local governments are quantitatively decomposed in the form of the target responsibility system from top to bottom, and the lower the administrative level, the more task indicators, and the more red tape accordingly, which leads to the grassroots to undertake the empowerment of a larger number of matters, the administrative process is lengthy, and the multiple checks, assessments and inspections are more and more frequent, and on average, H-townships have about five to six welcome inspections of varying sizes every week. H Township, many cadres said that the township level affairs generally increased, the grassroots gradually increased the burden of various types of assessment, inspection has been made township civil servants tired to cope with the "mountains and seas," "white plus black" "Seven plus two" phenomenon appears more and more frequently. For example, the 12345 hotline, township cadres both on the ground to deal with the problem so that the masses "100%" satisfaction, but also to the masses reflect every problem, the processing process and the results of the content of the use of text, pictures to illustrate the monthly summary, in addition to all kinds of problems with the form of collation and summary in order to cope with the inspection from the higher level. Some cadres said that "20% of the time is spent on solving problems on the ground, and 80% of the time is spent on coping with the materials". In order to cope with the pressure of assessment, the grassroots are caught up in red tape, emphasizing the process rather than the results, leaving traces and formalism have become the optimal behavioral strategy for grass-roots civil servants, and taking the initiative to act and create public value has become a luxury.

## 5. Cracking the way to incentive township civil servants

In order to stimulate the willingness of township civil servants to take the initiative to start their own business, it is necessary to take into account both material incentives and spiritual incentives, and it is urgent to make changes and adjustments at the level of the system and working methods, so that the two can play a role in conjunction with each other. At the same time, should be based on different groups of portraits targeted incentive programs, from the overall to local standpoint to grasp.

First, explore the construction of a reasonable civil service pay system. On the one hand, it is necessary to appropriately increase the salaries of civil servants at the grass-roots level in townships and villages. With the development of market economy in our country, the inflation rate is always high, the family consumption expenditure is growing rapidly, the current civil servants' salary and subsidy standard can not adapt to the present level of economic and social development, we should reasonably increase the income of civil servants, and play the role of health care factor of the salary[14]. At the same time, to take into account the special nature of the work of the township civil servants, comprehensive consideration of the specific work content, work intensity,,, working environment, transportation, the local financial situation, within the scope of the policy allows, in the work of the subsidies, performance bonuses can be modestly tilted to the township civil servants. Especially similar to H townships such as mountainous areas should be enhanced remuneration, its work is a long way and dangerous, most of the staff in order to avoid enduring extreme commuting, can only choose to go home on weekends. On the other hand, it is necessary to establish a differentiated mechanism for the payment of job subsidies. The establishment of a differentiated post subsidy payment mechanism can be explored, and a dynamic adjustment mechanism can be set up according to different posts, different work contents and work intensity, so as to improve the fairness of subsidy and treatment payment. At the implementation level, sufficient financial resources to ensure that the promised subsidies and performance bonuses are put in place, "blank check", on the contrary, will dampen the enthusiasm of township civil servants to start their own businesses.

Secondly, attention should be paid to fostering a positive organizational culture within the Government. Organizational culture will have an important impact on individual behavior. When an organization has cohesion and a good atmosphere of active work, it will influence and drive more members of the organization to regulate their own behavior. On the contrary, when the culture of lying flat in the organization spread, will lead to the entire grass-roots organizations operating in a loose manner. In particular, the recent problem of "rejuvenation of official oil" is a wake-up call. Grass-roots work consists of various lines of interspersed composition, to achieve a work goal is inseparable from the grass-roots civil servants within the mutual interface between the coordination, in which any one of the links have problems may lead to the final performance is greatly reduced. Therefore, it is crucial to form a positive and proactive working atmosphere within the township government as a whole. Organizational culture building is closely related to the ability and willingness of the leadership team within the grassroots government. On the one hand, it is important to establish a proactive culture within the organization, with the leadership team leading by example. On the other hand, it is necessary to have the ability to create and maintain an organizational culture, shape its identity, and guide the behavior and values of grassroots cadres so as to achieve administrative goals. This requires the leadership team to put themselves in the shoes of township civil servants, focusing on strengthening care and concern for them in many ways, and understanding their career plans and aspirations. In the event that they are not promoted for the time being, emphasis should be placed on giving them support for their work in terms of improving their working ability, assigning work tasks and learning and training. Due to the township civil servants for a long time in the high-pressure and high strength of the work state, the mood will inevitably fluctuate, the leading cadres should pay attention to strengthen the guidance to guide the township cadres to turn the work into a personal pursuit and interest in the organization to cultivate the cadres who dare to take responsibility for the work of the cadres who are good at work, and to promote the formation of the "capable on the level of mediocrity, mediocre down" officer The organization has been promoting the formation of a strong atmosphere of "those who can do, those who are mediocre will be let go, and those who are mediocre will be let go.

Once again, channels for the promotion of grass-roots civil servants should be broadened. During the grass-roots research, township civil servants complained that the workload and incentives do not match, do things can not always emphasize the faith, once or twice to emphasize faith can be valid, but more often than not, it will be easy to make the grass-roots cadres resentment, resulting in poor results. Is to grass-roots civil service incentives can not always be in the spirit of the level to be pie, on the contrary, should be to see the hope for the standard, to meet the grass-roots civil service promotion expectations. Therefore, to open up the township civil service promotion channels, optimize the cadre exchange mechanism. The incentives for civil servants should be differentiated according to the position, age and rank[15]. On the one hand, it is reasonable to set the proportion of civil servants of the district departments assigned to the townships, and give the township civil servants enough space for promotion. On the other hand, we should let the cadres who have outstanding achievements have a bigger stage, and dare to rush to the front line of the attackers in the township work, and be brave in innovation and entrepreneurship, emergency charge, and love and dedication to the selection of the person up, and really do have a place for the person who has a place for the person who has a place for the person who has a place for the person who has a place for the person. Township civil service promotion mechanism, we should pay attention to the following aspects: First, we should focus on building a fair and open selection mechanism, in strict accordance with the promotion procedures, and resolutely put an end to the "backdoor" "greetings" of the undesirable phenomenon; Secondly, in the process of selecting and employing people should be Secondly, in the process of selecting and employing



people, it is necessary to insist on openness and transparency, and to take the responsibility of practical work as the orientation of employing people. Finally, for the masses of suspicion and doubt should be timely acceptance, timely feedback findings, incompetent people resolutely do not use, the masses of people with poor reputation resolutely do not choose.

Repeatedly, it is necessary to stimulate the enthusiasm of officers and entrepreneurs in county departments to sink. One is to give humanistic care, pay attention to the spiritual incentives for such civil servants, to help them change their mentality. Leadership team can communicate with them from time to time, from their work, life and other aspects of care and attention, as far as possible to help them solve the difficulties of life, including improving the working environment, improve welfare benefits, etc., so that they feel the warmth of the new organization, to eliminate the negative thoughts of the day, to bridge the inequality of their hearts, and the formation of the work of the township of recognition and love. The second is to promote their integration into the township government by carrying out activities. On the one hand, the unit can carry out some training and counseling activities for stress relief and emotional release, and guide the civil servants to deal with their personal emotions in some scientific and reasonable ways and means, so that they can adjust their mentality quickly, and get on the right track both psychologically and at work. On the other hand, we should strengthen the training work, enhance their faith and sense of purpose, and forge their ability to take root at the grassroots level. Thirdly, we should build a platform for them to start their own business. In order to improve the county department sinking personnel officer entrepreneurial enthusiasm, conditions permit, the unit can be appropriate to tilt part of the organizational resources to protect its officers, focusing on its proposed recommendations. By building a stage for them to show their ability to realize their own value, as a way to motivate civil servants to take the initiative to improve their participation in the work of the internal motivation, and strive to let the grass-roots civil servants not only to improve themselves, but also to serve the people for the benefit of the public.

Finally, at the institutional level, it is necessary to "lighten the load" and "loosen the constraints" of grass-roots civil servants. First, we must establish a correct orientation of discipline and accountability. The central "on further incentivizing the majority of cadres in the new era of new role as the new opinions" clearly put forward, "the tolerance of the bold tolerance of error" "tolerance of cadres in the reform and innovation in the mistakes and errors". The work of the township has a wide range of work, work is complicated, to protect, support and encourage the courage to play the role of township cadres. Reasonable use of negative incentives, not only to not as, slow as, chaotic as the township civil servants for accountability treatment, but also to avoid or reduce in the implementation of the work due to a slight error deviation brought about by the occupational risk, to prevent the generalization of the accountability, the accountability of excessive. Secondly, we should establish a fault tolerance and correction mechanism[16]. In all kinds of target assessment, cadre selection and appointment, job rank promotion and other aspects of the fault tolerance and exemption of cadres and other cadres as the same, fully stimulate the township civil servants to forge ahead, the spirit of entrepreneurship. Third, the scientific division of power and responsibility belonging. Clearly district departments and townships of the responsibility of the border, the compaction of the responsibility of the district departments to achieve consistency of authority and responsibility, and resolutely avoid the "territorial management" to push it away, and effectively give the townships to reduce the burden, "loose". Reduce the frequency of various types of inspection, supervision, assessment, resolutely change to the townships to issue orders, supervision, notification of accountability-based approach, and effectively reduce the burden for the grassroots. At the same time, to establish a daily talk system, the township civil servants have shortcomings and mistakes or shortcomings, to carry out timely talk, to achieve the effect of preventing small steps.

The incentive of civil servants in townships is an important element of the subject. Coastal economically developed areas can provide sufficient health care incentives for grass-roots cadres, but in the western region, due to the constraints of tight financial resources, relying heavily on material incentives is not operational, and even the government's operating funds are difficult. Therefore, incentives for grassroots civil servants should begin at the institutional and working levels to provide support for their work. As many interviewees said, working in a small town relies more on a sentiment. Accordingly, incentives should revolve around maintaining their sentiments and should never make them feel cold towards the organization. Township civil servants come and go, and the rate of outflow in H-township is much higher than in other townships in the county. This situation is obviously not conducive to the normal development of township work in the long term. Therefore, the incentives for grass-roots civil servants, especially in economically backward and remote areas, should be put in a better position to think of solutions.

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